Introduction
In the classical model of transferable utility games it is generally assumed that any subset of a set N of players can form a coalition and cooperate. However, many real world situations appear which require a more re…ned model which takes into account restrictions in cooperation. In Myerson's [14] model the feasible coalitions are induced by connected subgraphs. This line of research was continued by Owen [19] , Borm et al. [7] , van den Nouweland et al. [17] and Potters and Reijnierse [20] . However, as stated by Myerson himself, partial cooperation can not always be modelled by a graph, so, the original communication model has been generalized in several directions, for instance towards conference structures by Myerson [15] , hypergraph communication situations by van den Nouweland et al. [17] and union stable systems by Algaba et al. [1, 2] .
In Algaba et al. [1, 2] it is assumed that if two feasible coalitions have common players, these ones will act as intermediaries between the two coalitions in order to establish meaningful communication in the union of these coalitions. These feasible coalition systems are called union stable systems. This mathematical feature is essential and the only requirement in these systems to establish the cooperation. In fact, di¤erent lines of research in the literature of cooperative games can be uni…ed through these systems. For instance, the feasible coalitions coming from graph communication situations [14] and permission structures (see [8, 12] ) are special union stable systems. Furthermore, these systems have a close relation with the hypergraph communication situations [4] . Important properties on the class of union stable systems have been studied by Faigle et al. [11] who in this framework …nd a meaningful notion of supermodularity that extends Shapley´s convex cooperative model.
The basis of a union stable system requires special attention and it is formed by its supports that in a communication situation are the edges of the graph and the singletons. In fact, the supports are those feasible coalitions that are not the union of two other non-disjoint feasible coalitions. All other feasible coalitions can be written as a union of non-disjoint supports. Two games that play an important role in games on union stable systems are the restricted game and the conference game, generalizing the corresponding games for communication situations. The restricted game is de…ned on the set of players and assigns to every coalition of players the worth that they can earn given the cooperation restrictions. The conference game is de…ned on the set of non unitary supports of the union stable system and assigns to every coalition of non unitary supports the worth that the 'grand coalition'consisting of all players can earn in the union stable cooperation structure generated by these supports. In this paper, we …rst analyze the relation between the restricted game and the conference game to establish later what e¤ects a union stable system has on certain desirable properties of these games. In this way, relations between the properties of the restricted game and the conference game are investigated. We also consider the Myerson value, studied earlier in Algaba et al. [2] , and show that from the study of the convexity of the conference game, we can provide su¢ cient conditions under which the Myerson value is in the core of the restricted game without requiring conditions on the structure or the restricted game. This emphasizes the role of the conference game on the Myerson value and a new approach to it.
After that we use supports and the conference game to provide axiomatizations of the Myerson value for games on union stable systems. In particular, we use the super ‡uous support property stating that the payo¤ allocation should not depend on supports that in some sense have no contribution. Together with component e¢ ciency, component dummy, additivity and point unanimity we give a characterization of the Myerson value on a special class of union stable systems that contains those that arise from cycle-free graphs (and on which the position value was characterized in [1] ). We also provide an axiomatization of the Myerson value on the class of all union stable systems by replacing the super ‡uous support property by the new strong super ‡uous support property which is de…ned using the restricted game, and inspired by the corresponding axiom for communication situations in van den Nouweland [18] .
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recalls the general concepts on classical cooperation, the main de…nitions on restricted cooperation by means of union stable systems including the crucial driving notions of basis and supports, the restricted game, the conference game as well as the Myerson value and the position value. In Section 3, we analyze the relation between the restricted game and the conference game and the inheritance of properties. Section 4 contains axiomatizations of the Myerson value. We …rst provide an axiomatization for games on the special class of union stable systems that generalize the set of connected coalitions in a cycle-free graph, using the super ‡uous support property. Second, we provide an axiomatization on the class of all union stable systems by means of the strong super ‡uous support property. Finally, a section of conclusions is given.
Preliminaries

Cooperative TU-games
A cooperative transferable utility (TU)-game is a pair (N; v) where N = f1; : : : ; ng is a …nite set of players and v :
A distribution of the amount v(N ) among the players will be represented by a real-valued vector x 2 R n . Here x i represents the payo¤ to player i according to the involved payo¤ vector x. A solution is a real-valued function that assigns a payo¤ vector to every game v. A solution f satis…es the e¢ ciency principle if
The most well-known solution concept is the Shapley value (Shapley [21] ) given by
The core of a game (N; v) is the set
where x(S) = P i2S x i and x (;) = 0. Bondareva [6] and Shapley [22] state that a game (N; v) is balanced if and only if it has a nonempty core. A game is called totally balanced if each subgame is balanced.
Union stable systems
Let N = f1; : : : ; ng be a …nite set of players and F 2 N a set system of feasible coalitions. The set system F is called union stable if for all A;
Many real world situations …nd their natural framework in these structures. For instance, suppose that player 1 is a homeowner who wants to sell his/her house. Player 1 has signed a contract with a real estate agent that represents player 2. So, player 1 only can sell his/her house by means of player 2. There are two buyers, players 3 and 4. Notice that in this economic application, the family of feasible coalitions that can generate a surplus are only those which make possible that the seller can sell his/her house. Therefore, the coalitions which can trade are F = ff1; 2; 3g ; f1; 2; 4g ; f1; 2; 3; 4gg :
An important subclass of union stable systems is communication situations as considered in Myerson [14] . A communication situation is a triple (N; v; E), where (N; v) is a game and (N; E) is a simple graph. It is easy to see that the set system F, de…ned by those coalitions which induce connected subgraphs is a union stable system. However, in practice, a union stable system can not always be modelled by a communication situation (see van den Brink [9] for a characterization of the set systems that can be obtained as connected coalitions in a communication graph). For example, the set system F pointed out above with one seller/two buyers and a real state agent as intermediary is a union stable system which cannot be the set of connected coalitions in a communication graph. So, union stable systems not only allow for a generalization of set systems derived from communication graphs but also a better understanding and insight of them and their applications.
Let F be a union stable system and G F: The following families are de…ned inductively Notice that G (0) G (n 1) G (n) F; since G F and F is union stable. We de…ne G by G = G (k) ; where k is the smallest integer such that
For each union stable family F, it is interesting to …nd a minimal subset B (F) such that B (F) = F. So, the following set is well-de…ned:
The set B (F) = F n E (F) ; is called the basis of F, and the elements of B (F) are called supports of F. We remark that the basis B (F) is the minimal subset of the union stable system F such that B (F) = F (see Algaba et al. [1] ).
Let G 2 N be a set system and let S N . A set T S is called a G-component of S if T 2 G and there exists no T 0 2 G such that T T 0 S. Therefore, the G-components of S are the maximal feasible coalitions that belong to G and are contained in S. We denote by C G (S) the collection of the G-components of S. Union stable systems can be characterized in terms of the F-components of a coalition in the following way: The set system F 2 N is union stable if and only if for any S N with C F (S) 6 = ;, the F-components of S are a collection of pairwise disjoint subsets of S.
Let (N; v) be a cooperative game and F 2 N a union stable system. Let B(F) be the basis of F and C(F) = fB 2 B(F) : jBj 2g. If there is no confusion we will just write B and C. The F-restricted game v F : 2 N ! R; is de…ned on the player set and is given by
On the other hand, the conference game is de…ned on the basis of a union stable system and it is the game
Note that the game C; v C is well de…ned since for each A C; A is a union stable system. The F-restricted game focuses on the role of a player in creating economic possibilities and establishing meaningful communication among the players whereas the conference game measures the economic value of the grand coalition when speci…c parts of the cooperation structure are considered.
The two above de…nitions extend the point game (introduced by Myerson [14] ) and the arc game (introduced by Borm et al. [7] ) for communication situations, where for a communication situation (N; v; E) we have that C = ffi; jg : fi; jg 2 Eg.
A union stable cooperation structure is a triple (N; v; F) where N = f1; : : : ; ng is the set of players, (N; v) is a game with v : 2 N ! R satisfying v(;) = 0; and F is a union stable system. For convenience, we assume from now on that the underlying game (N; v) is zero-normalized.
The set of all union stable cooperation structures on N will be denoted by U S N = f(N; v; F) : F is union stableg :
We will denote by U SI N a special subclass of U S N where the following two conditions are satis…ed:
(1) For all S; T 2 F, with jS \ T j 2 we have S \ T 2 F.
(2) All non-unitary feasible coalitions can be written in a unique way as a union of non-unitary supports.
Notice that this subclass of union stable cooperation structures generalizes those communication situations for which the graphs do not contain cycles.
Allocation rules for union stable structures
An allocation rule on U S N is a map that assigns to each union stable cooperation structure (N; v; F) a payo¤ vector, (N; v; F) 2 R n .
Both the Myerson value and the position value are de…ned from the Shapley value [21] of the two games that were de…ned above, the F-restricted game and the conference game respectively. The Myerson value was introduced in Myerson [14] and later extended in [15] . Myerson pointed out the need to generalize this model towards restricted cooperation situations which can not be modelled by a graph. This idea has been studied by van den Nouweland et al. [17] and Algaba et al. [2] . So, given (N; v; F) a union stable cooperation structure, the Myerson value denoted by (N; v; F) 2 R n is de…ned by
The position value for graph communication situations was …rst introduced in Meesen [13] and studied in Borm et al. [7] . This value was extended to hypergraph communication situations in [17] and is de…ned in union stable cooperation structures in [1] . Let (N; v; F) be a union stable cooperation structure. The position value, denoted by (N; v; F) 2 R n , is given by
where C i (F) = fC 2 C : i 2 Cg. When there is no confusion we will often write C i instead of C i (F).
The following example illustrates the concepts of Myerson and position values for the economic application introduced in (1).
Consider the player set N = f1; 2; 3; 4g and the union stable family given by F = ff1; 2; 3g ; f1; 2; 4g ; N g :
Hence, the Myerson value for this situation is
The conference game is given by 3 Relation between the conference game and the restricted game
In the same way that there exists a connection between the arc game and the point game as shown in van den Nouweland and Borm [16] , here we establish a relation between the restricted game N; v F , and the conference game C; v C . Notice that the Myerson value and the position value have been de…ned from the Shapley value of the restricted game and the conference game respectively. So, the relationship between the restricted game and the conference game as well as the inheritance of properties as superadditivity, balancedness and convexity allows for a deeper knowledge and better insight into them.
Theorem 1 Let (N; v; F) be a union stable cooperation structure and C; v C the associated conference game. Then, for each S N it is satis…ed that
where C S = fC 2 C : C Sg.
Then F S is a union stable system such that C F S (N ) = C F (S). Its basis is B S = fB 2 B : B Sg. Let C S be the set formed by the supports of B S which have cardinal at least two. It holds that C S C. Therefore, for any coalition S N it is satis…ed that
The following results state the inheritance of balancedness, superadditivity and convexity from the conference game to the restricted game. First, we consider balancedness. Theorem 2 Let (N; v; F) be a union stable cooperation structure. If C; v C is non-negative and balanced, then N; v F is balanced.
Proof. As C; v C is non-negative and balanced,
Let y 2 C v C . From y, we construct the vector x 2 R n in the following way
otherwise, for each i 2 N . We have to prove that
On the other hand, X i2S
By Theorem 1, for each S N , v C (C S ) = v F (S) and as y C 0 and moreover fC 2 C S : i 2 Cg C i , we have
where the last inequality holds because y 2 C v C . Hence we conclude that N; v F is balanced. A similar result holds with respect to superadditivity.
Theorem 3 Let (N; v; F) be a union stable cooperation structure. If C; v C is superadditive and non-negative, then N; v F is superadditive.
Proof. Let S; T N; S \ T = ;: We have to prove that
For that, it su¢ ces to prove that C S \ C T = ; and that C S [ C T C S[T since, by the superadditivity and the monotonicity of the game C;
On the one hand, since
On the other hand, by construction of C S ; C T and C S[T we conclude that
The next example illustrates that, in general, balancedness or superadditivity of the underlying restricted game does not imply this property for the conference game.
Example 1 Let (N; v; F) be a union stable cooperation structure, where (N; F) is the union stable system considered in (1), i.e., N = f1; 2; 3; 4g, the feasible coalition system is F = ff1; 2; 3g ; f1; 2; 4g ; f1; 2; 3; 4gg and let the game be given by v(S) = jSj ; if j S j 2; 0; otherwise.
Note, that game (N; v) is totally balanced and therefore so is the game (N; v F ) (see [3] ). The corresponding conference game C; v C is given by v C (ff1; 2; 3gg) = v C (ff1; 2; 4gg) = 3 and v C (ff1; 2; 3g; f1; 2; 4gg) = 4, and thus is not balanced, since C = B = ff1; 2; 3g ; f1; 2; 4gg and hence,
C v C = n y 2 R jCj : y f1;2;3g + y f1;2;4g = 4, y f1;2;3g 3, y f1;2;4g 3 o = ;:
The game (N; v) is also superadditive and it is easy to show that then so is the game (N; v F ). However, the conference game C; v C is not superadditive, since v C (ff1; 2; 3g ; f1; 2; 4gg) v C (ff1; 2; 3gg) + v C (ff1; 2; 4gg);
As mentioned above this example can not be modelled by a communication situation.
Next, we study the transmission of convexity from the game C; v C to N; v F . Theorem 4 Let (N; v; F) be a union stable cooperation structure. If the conference game C; v C is non-negative and convex then N; v F is convex.
Therefore, the above is equivalent to prove that
On On the other hand, as C; v C is non negative and superadditive, we have
Moreover, by convexity of the game C;
Combining the two last expressions, we conclude
A study about the convexity between the original game and the conference game can be found in [1] , where subclasses of union stable families for which the convexity of the original game is inherited by the restricted game and the conference game respectively are given.
Notice that by means of properties of the conference game, it is possible to deduce conditions under which the Myerson value is in the core of the restricted game. It emphasizes the connection between the conference game and the Myerson value.
Theorem 4 and the fact that (N; v) 2 C (v) if v is convex, immediately yield the following corollary. Corollary 1 Let (N; v; F) be a union stable cooperation structure. If the conference game C; v C is non-negative and convex then
The transmission of the convexity from the original game to the conference game requires conditions on the union stable cooperation structure. In fact, if (N; v; F) 2 U SI N and (N; v) is convex then C; v C is convex (see [1] ). Moreover, notice that if (N; v) is superadditive and zero-normalized then C; v C is positive. Therefore, applying the above corollary, we can assure that on the subclass U SI N , if the original game is convex then the Myerson value is in the core of the restricted game.
The Myerson value and super ‡uous supports
The Myerson value and the position value are allocation rules satisfying component e¢ ciency and component dummy. In [2] the classical axiomatization of the Myerson value is given. In this section we focus on the super ‡uous support property which is satis…ed by the Myerson value and the position value.
We …rst characterize the Myerson value on the subclass U SI N of union stable cooperation structures where the position value was characterized (see [1] ) using the super ‡uous support property. After that, the introduction of a stronger property than the super ‡uous player property and super ‡uous support property allows us to provide new characterizations for the Myerson value on the class of all union stable cooperation structures. These axiomatizations generalize the given ones in communication situations by van den Nouweland [18] .
Axiomatizations of the Myerson value on U SI N using the super ‡uous support property
First, we recall some standard axioms. An allocation rule :
The Myerson value satisfying these three properties is shown in Algaba et al. [2] . Next we give formally the concept of super ‡uous support property which is de…ned using the conference game that was studied in the previous section.
The support H 2 C is called super ‡uous for (N; v; 
Theorem 5 The Myerson value
: U S N ! R n satis…es the super ‡uous support property.
Proof. Let H 2 C be a super ‡uous support. We have to prove that (N; v; F) = N; v; B n fHg : 
The fact that B 0 S = B S n fHg and H 2 C is a super ‡uous support imply
Notice that the super ‡uous support property is focussed on the conference game. Whereas the conference game concentrates on the role of the supports, the restricted game does on the role of the players. However, we should take into account that the conference game is closely related to the restricted game as we have shown in Theorem 1 and the analysis of the inheritance of properties between these games carried out in Section 2. In fact, the super ‡uous support property will allow for a new characterization of the Myerson value.
The Myerson value also satis…es point anonymity as is shown in [2] . ; for all i 2 D; 0; otherwise.
Since the Myerson value satis…es point anonymity, it also satis…es the weaker point unanimity. Next we show that the above properties characterize the Myerson value when we restrict ourselves to the class U SI N , where on the class U SI N the axioms are de…ned in a similar way as before on the full class U S N .
Theorem 6 The Myerson value : U SI N ! R n is the unique allocation rule on U SI N that satis…es component e¢ ciency, component-dummy, additivity, the super ‡uous support property and point unanimity.
Proof. The Myerson value satisfying component e¢ ciency, component-dummy, additivity and point anonymity (and therefore also point unanimity) is already shown in Algaba et al. [2] , while the super ‡uous support property follows from Theorem 5.
To show uniqueness, let (N; v; F) 2 U SI N and let : U SI N ! R n satisfy the above properties. Since the game v is zero-normalized, it can be expressed as v = X fT :jT j 2g T u T ; with u T the unanimity games.
As is additive, it is su¢ cient to show that (N; u T ; F), 2 R, is unique for all T N with jT j 2. To prove this, …x T N with jT j 2. We distinguish two cases Consider the set fF 2 F : T F g, which is non-empty since there exists S 2 F such that T S, and let
The set T is non-empty and it is the minimal feasible set that contains T . Hence,
(iv) T 2 F is the smallest feasible set that contains T , we have
it follows that the conference game associated to u T is,
On the other hand, as T = S k2K B k , with B k 2 C; for all k 2 K, we have
because the expression of each non-unitary feasible coalition as a union of non-unitary supports is unique. Hence,
All supports B 2 C such that B = 2 fB k g k2K , are super ‡uous for the conference game. Therefore, repeatedly applying the super ‡uous support property to the allocation rule , we …nd Notice that the strong super ‡uous support property is centered on the restricted game instead of the conference game. This new property states that the solution is the same after removing a support which has no in ‡uence on the communication in the sense that it does not change the worth of coalitions in the restricted game. Also notice that the strong super ‡uous support property implies the super ‡uous support property but the reverse is not true. Indeed, from the proof of Theorem 5 it follows that if H 2 C is a super ‡uous support then and thus = 0. Hence, i N; v v F ; F = 0, for all i 2 N . Obviously, the above lemma is satis…ed when substituting point unanimity for point anonymity.
Next, as mentioned above, we establish a characterization of the Myerson value on U S N only by replacing in the given characterization the super ‡uous support property with the strong super ‡uous support property. Here, we use the characterization given in [2] , where the Myerson value is characterized using the super ‡uous player property, which is analogous to the super ‡uous support property changing the conference game for the restricted game and the role of the supports for players.
Let Proof. By de…nition, it is straightforward that the Myerson value satis-…es the strong super ‡uous support property. Therefore, it only remains to prove uniqueness. Let be an allocation rule on U S N that satis…es component e¢ ciency, component-dummy, additivity, the strong super ‡uous support property and point unanimity. To prove that is uniquely determined, we …rst prove that if an allocation rule on U S N satis…es the strong super ‡uous support property then it satis…es the super ‡uous player property, and hence as the Myerson value is the unique allocation rule on U S N that satis…es additivity, the super ‡uous player property and point unanimity [2, Theorem 3.7] we deduce that = . (In concrete, this characterization was shown with point anonymity, but it is easy to check that the result holds with point unanimity).
Let i 2 N be a super ‡uous player for (N; v; F), i.e., v F (S) = v F (S n fig), for all S N .
We have to prove that
As is an additive allocation rule that satis…es component e¢ ciency, component-dummy and point unanimity, by Lemma 1 we have
It is satis…ed that
and thus, applying (3),
As Therefore, is an allocation rule that satis…es the super ‡uous player property and we conclude (N; v; F) = (N; v; F) , for all (N; v; F) 2 U S N :
Taking into account that point anonymity implies point unanimity, the Myerson value : U S N ! R n is the unique allocation rule on U S N that satis…es component e¢ ciency, component-dummy, additivity, the strong super ‡uous support property and point anonymity.
Conclusions
This paper makes some contributions to cooperative game theory with restricted cooperation in a framework that not only allows for the uni…cation and generalization of di¤erent research lines such as communication situations or permission structures but also the analysis of economic applications which arise in this context. At …rst sight, the Myerson value and the conference game, and therefore the supports, are not related. In this paper, we show the existence of a direct relationship between the Myerson value and the conference game. First, a study between the restricted game and the conference game as well as an analysis of the transmission of properties reveals the close connection between the Myerson value and the conference game. In fact, by means of the conference game it can be established when the Myerson value is in the core of the restricted game, without requirements about the structure or the restricted game. Second, an analysis about super ‡uous supports, or null players in the conference game, and the Myerson value leads us to characterizations of the Myerson value on a special subclass of union stable systems that contains those coming from cycle-free graphs. Finally, strengthening the super ‡uous support property and super ‡uous player property, two new characterizations for the Myerson value are provided on the class of all union stable structures. Therefore, important properties and characterizations of the Myerson value for games on union stable systems can be stated by the study of the conference game.
For communication situations, van den Brink et al. [10] introduce the class of Harsanyi power solution which can be obtained by distributing the Harsanyi dividends in the point game proportional to some power measure for communication graphs. This class contains the Myerson value which is obtained by using the equal power measure. This approach is generalized to games on union stable systems by Algaba et al. [5] . Although every Harsanyi power solution satis…es the super ‡uous support property on the class USI N ; in general they do not satisfy this property on US N ; and therefore the same is true for the strong super ‡uous support property. Thus, in some sense the super ‡uous support property and the role of the conference game are characteristic for the Myerson value within the class of Harsanyi power solutions. On the other hand, the position value, which has a quite di¤erent interpretation and de…nition than the Myerson value (introduced through the conference game instead of the restricted game), also satis…es the super ‡uous support property on US N . However, this is not a Harsanyi power solution, although it is on the class USI N .
